Discourses on Livy

Book 1, Chapter 1: The Origins of Cities and Rome

No one who reads how the city of Rome began, who its founders were, and what institutions and laws it had will wonder that it maintained so much excellence for so many centuries, or that it later became so great an empire.

First, concerning its origins, I say that all cities have been founded either by people native to the country where they stand or by outsiders. Cities arise in the first way when a country’s inhabitants find they cannot live safely while scattered among many small communities. Whether because of its location or its small population, each community is unable to withstand an enemy’s attack alone. When enemies approach, there is no time to unite for defense without abandoning many strongholds and thus becoming easy prey for the invader. To escape these dangers, either on their own initiative or at the urging of someone with greater authority among them, they confine their settlements to certain places where they think it will be more convenient to live and easier to defend themselves.

Among the many cities that began this way were Athens and Venice. For reasons like those just mentioned, a scattered population built Athens under the direction of Theseus. Venice began when numerous refugees took shelter on small islands in a corner of the Adriatic Sea. They were fleeing the wars that, as the Roman Empire declined, were renewed daily in Italy by the arrival of fresh hordes of barbarians. Without any recognized leader to direct them, they agreed to live together under the laws they thought best suited to preserve their community. Their location secured a prolonged peace. The narrow sea protected them, and the tribes then ravaging Italy had no ships with which to attack them. They were therefore able to rise from very small beginnings to the greatness they now enjoy.

In the second case, when outsiders found a city, the settlers are either completely independent or under the control of others. The latter occurs when a prince or republic sends out colonies to relieve a country of excess population, or to defend newly acquired territories that it wants to secure at little expense. The Romans established many cities of this kind throughout their dominions. A prince may also found such a city simply to increase his fame, without intending to live there himself, as Alexander the Great built Alexandria. Since cities of this kind did not begin in freedom, they seldom advance far enough to rank among the chief cities of kingdoms.

Florence belongs to the class of cities that were not independent from the beginning. We may attribute its origin to Sulla’s soldiers or, as some have conjectured, to the mountain people of Fiesole. Encouraged by the long peace that prevailed throughout the world during the reign of Octavianus, these people came down to settle on the plain beside the Arno. In either case, Florence was founded under Rome’s authority and could initially advance only as far as the ruling state allowed.

Cities may be said to have an independent origin when a people, either on their own or under a prince, are forced by famine, plague, or war to leave their native land and seek a new home. Settlers of this kind either establish themselves in existing cities in the countries they occupy, as Moses did, or build new ones, as Aeneas did. In this last case, the founder’s abilities and the new city’s good fortune are most clearly seen. That good fortune will be more or less remarkable according to the greater or lesser ability of the person who founds it.

A founder’s ability is revealed in two ways: in his choice of a site and in the laws he frames. Since people act either from necessity or by choice, and their merit may seem greater where their freedom to choose is more restricted, we must consider whether it might be best to choose a barren district for a new city. Its inhabitants would then be forced to work hard and would be less corrupted by ease. They might live in closer unity, finding less cause for division in the poverty of their land. This was the case in Ragusa and many other cities built in similar places.

Such a choice would certainly be the wisest and most advantageous if people could be content to enjoy what is their own without seeking to rule over others. But because they must be strong to be safe, they are compelled to avoid these barren districts and settle in more fertile regions. There, the land’s fruitfulness allows them to grow in numbers, so that they can defend themselves against anyone who attacks them and overthrow anyone who resists their power.

As for the sluggishness such a location might breed, care must be taken to enforce through laws the hardships the site does not impose. The example of those wise nations must be followed that inhabited exceptionally fertile and delightful countries, likely to produce a listless and effeminate people unfit for any manly exercise. To prevent the harm caused by the pleasant and relaxing influence of their soil and climate, these nations subjected everyone who was to serve as a soldier to the severest training. As a result, they produced better soldiers than countries that were naturally rugged and barren.

Such was the ancient kingdom of the Egyptians. Although their land was the most bountiful of all, the rigorous training its laws enforced produced exceptionally brave soldiers. Had their names not been lost in antiquity, they might be thought to deserve greater praise than Alexander the Great and many others whose memory remains fresh in people’s minds. Even in recent times, anyone who considered the kingdom of the Sultan and the military order of the Mamelukes before Selim the Great Turk destroyed them must have seen how carefully they trained their soldiers in every kind of military exercise. This showed how greatly they feared the idleness to which their pleasant soil and climate might have inclined them, unless strict laws counteracted it. I say, then, that founding a city in a fertile region is a prudent choice when legal restraints properly balance the effects of that fertility.

When Alexander the Great considered adding to his fame by founding a city, the architect Dinocrates came and showed him how he could build it on Mount Athos. The mountain offered a strong position and could be shaped so that the city built there would resemble a human figure. This would be strange and striking, and worthy of so great a monarch. But when Alexander asked how the inhabitants would support themselves, Dinocrates answered that he had not thought of that. Alexander laughed, left Mount Athos as it stood, and built Alexandria, where the fertile soil and the nearness of the Nile and the sea could attract many people to settle.

Anyone investigating Rome’s origins will therefore count it among the cities founded by outsiders if he attributes its beginning to Aeneas, or among those founded by natives if he attributes it to Romulus. But whichever class we place it in, we will see that it began in freedom, without subjection to another state. We will also see, as I shall discuss later, how strict a discipline the laws established by Romulus, Numa, and its other founders imposed on it. For many centuries, neither the fertility of its land, its nearness to the sea, the number of its victories, nor the extent of its dominion could corrupt it. On the contrary, the discipline of its laws kept it full of virtues unmatched in any other commonwealth.

Rome’s achievements, celebrated by Livy, were accomplished at home or abroad through public or private wisdom. I shall begin by discussing those domestic actions taken in accordance with the public will that seem most worthy of attention, and by examining their consequences. The whole of this first book, or first part of my Discourses, will be devoted to that purpose.

Book 1, Chapter 2: Rome’s Mixed Government

I will leave aside all discussion of cities that were initially dependent on others. I will speak only of those that, from their earliest beginnings, were entirely free of foreign control and governed themselves as they pleased, whether as republics or principalities.

Just as these cities had different origins, they also had different laws and institutions. Some received their laws from a single lawgiver, all at once, either at their foundation or soon afterward, as the Spartans received theirs from Lycurgus. Others received them at different times, as needs arose or circumstances dictated, as happened in Rome. A republic may indeed be called fortunate if it has a founder wise enough to provide laws under which it can live securely without needing to amend them. Sparta, for example, preserved its laws for eight hundred years without deterioration or any dangerous disturbance.

By contrast, a state suffers some misfortune if, instead of entrusting itself once and for all to a single wise lawgiver, it must reshape its own institutions. By far the most unfortunate of these states is the one furthest removed from a sound system of government. By this I mean that its institutions lie entirely outside any path that might lead it to a true and perfect outcome. A state in this position can scarcely ever put itself right, whatever opportunities arise. But a state with imperfect institutions may eventually reach perfection if it has made a good beginning that allows for improvement.

It is certain, however, that such states can never be reformed without great risk. As a rule, people will accept no new law changing their state’s institutions unless the need for that change has been demonstrated. Since this need cannot arise without danger, the state may easily be overthrown before the new order is established. The republic of Florence provides an example: it was reformed in 1502 because of the affair of Arezzo, but ruined in 1512 because of the affair of Prato.

To discuss the nature of Rome’s government and establish what chance circumstances brought it to perfection, I begin with what many writers on government have said before: there are three forms, known as monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. Those who establish a state’s institutions choose one of these three according to their purpose.

Other writers, whom many have considered wiser, maintain that there are six forms of government altogether. Three are thoroughly bad; the other three are good in themselves, but so easily corrupted that they too can become harmful. The good forms are the three just named. The bad forms are three others that grow out of them, each so closely resembling its counterpart that the transition from one to the other can pass unnoticed. Monarchy readily becomes tyranny, aristocracy becomes oligarchy, and democracy tends to degenerate into anarchy. Thus, if a state’s founder establishes any one of the three good forms, he establishes it for only a short time. No precaution he takes can prevent it from slipping into its opposite, because in each case the virtue so closely resembles the vice.

These different forms of government arise among people by chance. At the beginning of the world, its inhabitants were few and for a time lived scattered like beasts. Later, as their numbers grew, they gathered into communities. To protect themselves better, they began to look for the strongest and most courageous among them, whom they made their leader and obeyed.

Next came an understanding of what is honorable and good, as opposed to what is bad and shameful. People observed that when someone wronged his benefactor, everyone hated the offender and sympathized with the injured person. They saw that the ungrateful were blamed and the grateful honored. Reflecting that the wrongs done to others might also be done to them, they sought protection by making laws and setting punishments for anyone who broke them. In this way, the recognition of justice developed. Afterward, when choosing rulers, people no longer looked for the strongest man, but for the wisest and most just.

Soon, however, sovereignty became hereditary rather than elective. Hereditary rulers began to fall away from the example of their ancestors. Abandoning worthy conduct, they came to believe that princes had nothing to do but surpass everyone else in lavish display, sexual indulgence, and every other source of pleasure. The prince thus came to be hated and consequently afraid. From fear he turned to harming others, and tyranny soon arose.

Movements to overthrow the prince followed at once, along with plots and conspiracies against him. These were undertaken by men distinguished by birth, courage, wealth, and standing, who could not tolerate the tyrant’s shameful life, rather than by the weak or those afraid for their own safety. Following these powerful men, the multitude took up arms against the prince. Once he was removed, they obeyed the others as their liberators.

These liberators, hating the very name of sole ruler, formed a government among themselves. At first, while the memory of tyranny remained fresh, they observed the laws they had made. Putting the common welfare before personal advantage, they managed both public and private affairs with the greatest care and zeal. Later, however, the government passed to their descendants. Never having been schooled by adversity, these knew nothing of fortune’s reversals. Unwilling to remain content with equality under the laws, they gave themselves over to greed, ambition, and lust. Disregarding civil rights, they turned government by the best into government by the few, and very soon met the same fate as the tyrant.

For the multitude, loathing its rulers, supported anyone who dared to attack them, by whatever means. Soon one man arose who overthrew them with the people’s help. But the people still vividly remembered the tyrant and the wrongs they had suffered at his hands, and had no wish to restore monarchy. They therefore turned to popular government, establishing it on a basis that left no place for either king or nobles.

Since every government inspires respect at first, this one also lasted for a time. But it did not last long, seldom surviving the generation that had established it. Liberty suddenly turned into license. Neither personal merit nor public authority commanded respect; everyone lived as he pleased, and a thousand wrongs were committed every day. Then, whether driven by necessity or prompted by some wiser man among them, the people returned to monarchy to escape anarchy. From there, step by step, in the manner and for the reasons already given, they came around once more to license.

This is the cycle within which all states are and have been governed. Yet the same forms of government rarely recur in the same state, because hardly any state has enough vitality to pass through such a cycle more than once and still hold together. In some period of disaster, when a state must always lack wise counsel and strength, it can be expected to fall under the control of a neighboring, better-governed state. If that did not happen, however, it might continue indefinitely to pass from one form of government to another.

I say, then, that all six forms of government are harmful: the three good forms because they last so briefly, and the three bad forms because of their inherent badness. Wise lawgivers, recognizing these defects, have avoided each of these forms on its own. Instead, they have chosen a form that combines the qualities of the first three, judging it more stable and lasting than any one of them separately. For when monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy exist together in the same city, each checks the others.

Among those who have earned particular praise for devising such a constitution was Lycurgus. He framed Sparta’s laws so that kings, nobles, and common people each had their proper functions. In this way he established a government that lasted for more than eight hundred years, bringing him great glory and his country peace and tranquility.

The opposite happened with Solon. Through the form he gave Athens’s institutions, he created a purely democratic government. It lasted so briefly that he himself lived to see the beginning of the despotism of Pisistratus. Forty years later, the heirs of Pisistratus were driven out and Athens regained its freedom. Yet because the city returned to the same form of government Solon had established, it could maintain it for only another hundred years. Many laws were passed to preserve it by restraining the ambition of the powerful and the turbulence of the people, neither of which Solon had guarded against. Still, because neither the monarchical nor the aristocratic element had a place in its constitution, Athens had only a short life compared with Sparta.

Let us now turn to Rome. It had no Lycurgus to give it, from the beginning, a constitution that would long preserve its freedom. Yet through a series of accidents arising from struggles between the common people and the senate, it obtained by chance what its founders had failed to provide through foresight. If fortune did not bestow its first favors on Rome, it bestowed its second. For although the city’s original institutions were defective, they did not lie outside the true path that could bring them to perfection.

Romulus and the other kings made many good laws that were compatible with freedom. But because they sought to found a kingdom rather than a republic, much was found lacking when the city became free. These deficiencies had to be supplied in the interest of liberty, since the kings had not supplied them. Although Rome’s kings lost their sovereignty in the manner and for the reasons described above, those who expelled them immediately created two consuls to take their place. In this way they preserved royal authority in Rome while banishing the royal name. With both senate and consuls included in the republic, it possessed two of the three elements already listed: the monarchical and the aristocratic.

It remained only to give the popular element its place. When the Roman nobles grew insolent, for reasons I will discuss later, the common people rose against them. To avoid losing all their power, the nobles were forced to concede a share to the people. With the share that remained, the senate and consuls retained enough authority to preserve their own place in the republic. This led to the creation of the tribunes of the people. Their creation greatly increased the state’s stability, since each of the three forms of government now had its proper influence.

Rome was so fortunate that, although its government passed from kings to nobles and from nobles to the people by the steps and for the reasons described above, royal authority was not wholly sacrificed to strengthen the nobles, nor were the nobles stripped of their authority to give it to the common people. Instead, all three elements blended into a perfect state. As the next two chapters will fully show, this perfection was reached through the dissensions between the common people and the senate.