Introduction: Key Definitions and Foundational Principles
To avoid confusion in our investigation of the end for which God created the world, we should observe a distinction between the chief end for which an agent performs any work and the ultimate end. These two phrases don't always mean precisely the same thing: while the chief end is always an ultimate end, not every ultimate end is always a chief end. A chief end is the opposite of an inferior end; an ultimate end is the opposite of a subordinate end.
A subordinate end is something an agent pursues not for its own sake, but entirely because it serves a further end. It's simply a means to something else. For example, when someone travels to get medicine to restore their health, obtaining that medicine is a subordinate end. They don't value the medicine for its own sake at all, but only as a means to a further end: their health. Take away that further end, and the medicine becomes worthless to them.
An ultimate end is what the agent seeks for its own sake in whatever he does. It's what he loves, values, and takes pleasure in on its own account, not merely as a means to something else. For instance, when someone loves the taste of a particular fruit and goes to the trouble and expense of getting it, he does so for the pleasure of that taste. He values it on its own account because he loves his own pleasure, not merely because enjoying that pleasure will lead to some other good.
Some ends are subordinate not only because they serve an ultimate end, but also because they serve another end that is itself subordinate. In fact, there can be a whole chain of subordinate ends, each one dependent on the next, each one pursued for the sake of another, before you reach something the agent actually wants for its own sake. Consider a man who sells a coat to get money, uses that money to buy farming tools, uses those tools to work his land, works the land to grow crops, grows crops to make food, and eats the food to satisfy his hunger. He wants to satisfy his hunger for its own sake, because eating is inherently satisfying. In this case, selling the coat to get money is just a subordinate end. It's subordinate not only to the ultimate end (satisfying his hunger) but also to a nearer end (buying farming tools). Getting the tools is also just a subordinate end, since he only wants them so he can work the land. Working the land isn't pursued for its own sake either, but for the crop it will produce. The crop itself is pursued only to make bread. And bread is pursued to satisfy hunger.
We call satisfying the appetite the ultimate end because it's the last link in the chain, the point where the man's aim finally comes to rest. He's reached what he was ultimately after. Whenever someone reaches the point where his desire stops and rests, having found something he values for its own sake, he's reached an ultimate end. The chain can be long or short. It doesn't matter if there are many links or just one step before reaching this end. Take a man who loves honey and puts it in his mouth simply for the pleasure of tasting it, without aiming at anything beyond that experience. This shows that an end can be both immediate and ultimate at the same time: both the next end and the last end. An end that's sought for its own sake, not for the sake of something further, is an ultimate end. That's where the agent's aim stops and rests.
Something we pursue can function as both an ultimate goal and a subordinate one. We might seek it partly for its own sake and partly because it leads to something else. For example, a man might work to gain someone's love and respect for two reasons: first, because being esteemed and loved is inherently pleasant, and second, because that person's friendship might help him accomplish other objectives. In this way, he positions himself to achieve further goals.
A chief end (the opposite of an inferior end) differs from an ultimate end. It's what the person values most and therefore pursues most eagerly in his actions. Clearly, valuing one end more than another is not quite the same as valuing something ultimately, or for its own sake. This becomes clear when we consider two points:
1. Two different ends can both be ultimate without being chief ends. Both can be valued for their own sake and pursued through the same actions, yet one can be valued more highly and sought more intensely than the other. Consider a man who takes a journey to obtain two different benefits, both of which appeal to him in themselves. Yet one may be far more appealing than the other, making it what he sets his heart on chiefly. For instance, a man might travel partly to claim and enjoy the company of a bride he dearly loves, and partly to satisfy his curiosity by looking through a telescope or some newly invented and remarkable optical instrument. Neither goal is properly subordinate to the other, so both qualify as ultimate ends. Yet obtaining his beloved bride remains his chief end, while the benefit of the optical instrument remains his inferior end.
2. An ultimate end isn't always the chief end, because we may value and pursue some subordinate ends more than some ultimate ends. For instance, a man might have two goals for his journey: one, to visit his friends, and another, to receive a large sum of money. The latter might be only a subordinate end. He may not value the silver and gold for their own sake, but only for the pleasure, satisfaction, and honor they bring. The money is valued only as a means to something else. Yet obtaining the money may be valued more highly, making it a higher end of his journey than the pleasure of seeing his friends, even though the latter is valued for its own sake and is therefore an ultimate end.
But several things need to be noted here:
First, when we say that some subordinate ends may be valued more than some ultimate ends, we don't mean that a subordinate end is ever valued more than the thing it serves. It's called a subordinate end precisely because it's valued and pursued not for its own sake, but only in service to a further end. However, a subordinate end may be valued more than some other ultimate end that it doesn't serve. For instance, a man takes a journey to receive a sum of money, valuing the money only for the pleasure and honor it can provide. In this case, it's impossible for the subordinate end (having the money) to be valued more by him than the pleasure and honor for which he values it. It would be absurd to suppose he values the means more than the end when he values the means only for the sake of that end. Yet he may value the money, though it's only a subordinate end, more than some other ultimate end to which it's not subordinate and with which it has no connection. For instance, more than the comfort of a friendly visit, which was one ultimate end of his journey.
Second, the ultimate end is always superior to its subordinate end, and the agent values it more highly, unless the ultimate end depends entirely on the subordinate one. If someone has no other way to reach their final goal, then they may value the subordinate end just as much as the ultimate end, because in that case the final goal depends completely on it and is conveyed wholly and certainly through it. For instance, imagine a pregnant woman who has an intense craving for a rare fruit that grows only in the garden of a particular friend who lives some distance away. She makes a journey to her friend's house to get that fruit. The ultimate end of her journey is to satisfy that strong craving; obtaining the fruit is the subordinate end. If she believes the craving can be satisfied by no other means than getting that fruit, and that it will certainly be satisfied if she gets it, then she will value the fruit just as much as she values satisfying her appetite. But otherwise, this won't be the case. If she's uncertain whether that fruit will actually satisfy her craving, then she won't value it equally with the satisfaction of her appetite itself. Or if there's some other fruit she knows about that will gratify her desire, at least partly, which she can obtain without trouble that would outweigh the satisfaction (or if her appetite can't be gratified without this fruit, but not with it alone either, without something else combined with it), then her value for her final end will be divided among these various ingredients as so many subordinate ends, and no single one will be valued equally with the ultimate end. This is why it rarely happens that a subordinate end is valued equally with its ultimate end: because achieving an ultimate end rarely depends on one single, simple means that's infallibly connected with it. Therefore, people's ultimate ends are typically their highest ends.
Third, if any being has only one ultimate end in everything he does, and there's a great variety of operations, his last end can justly be considered his supreme end. In such a case, every other end except that one exists to serve that end, and therefore no other can be superior to it. As I noted before, a subordinate end is never valued more than the end it serves. Moreover, the subordinate effects or events brought about as means to this end all unite to contribute their share toward obtaining the one last end, and they are very diverse. Therefore, by what I've just observed, the ultimate end of all must be valued more than any one of the particular means. This seems to be the case with God's works, as may become clearer later.
Fourth, whatever any agent has in view in anything he does, which is agreeable to him in itself and not merely for the sake of something else, is regarded by that agent as his last end. The same can be said of avoiding what is in itself painful or disagreeable, for avoiding what is disagreeable is itself agreeable. This will be evident to anyone who keeps in mind the meaning of the terms. By last end I mean that which is regarded and sought by an agent as agreeable or desirable for its own sake. A subordinate end is that which is sought only for the sake of something else.
Fifth, from this it follows that if an agent has in view more things than one that will be brought about by what he does, which he loves and delights in on their own account, then he must have more things than one that he regards as his last ends in what he does. But if there is only one thing that an agent seeks on its own account, then there can be only one last end which he has in all his actions and operations.
But we need to make a distinction here about things that can be said to be agreeable to an agent, considered in themselves: (1) What is inherently pleasing to an agent and valued for its own sake, simply and absolutely considered, prior to and independent of all conditions or any assumption of particular cases and circumstances. And (2) what can be said to be inherently agreeable to an agent hypothetically and consequentially, or on the assumption of certain circumstances, or when a particular case occurs.
For instance, a person might naturally love companionship. An inclination toward companionship might be built into his very nature, and companionship might be agreeable to him prior to any assumed cases and circumstances. This might lead him to seek a family. And the comfort of companionship might originally be his ultimate end in seeking a family. But after he has a family, peace, good order, and mutual justice and friendship within his family might be agreeable to him and things he delights in for their own sake. Therefore these things might become his ultimate end in many things he does in governing and managing his family. But they were not his original end with respect to his family. The justice and peace of a family was not properly his ultimate end before he had a family, which led him to seek a family, but rather consequentially. And given the case of his having a family, then these things in which the good order and beauty of a family consist become his ultimate end in many things he does in such circumstances.
In the same way, we must assume that before God created the world, he had some good in view as a consequence of the world's existence. This good was originally agreeable to him in itself, and it inclined him to bring the universe into existence in the way he did. But after the world was created, and certain intelligent creatures actually existed in certain circumstances, then a wise and just regulation of them became agreeable to God in itself. God's love of justice and hatred of injustice would be sufficient in such a case to lead God to deal justly with his creatures and to prevent any injustice toward them. Yet there is no need to suppose that God's love of doing justly toward intelligent beings, and his hatred of the opposite, was what originally led God to create the world and make intelligent beings, thereby setting up the occasion for acting either justly or unjustly. The justice of God's nature makes just regulation agreeable and the opposite disagreeable when the occasion arises: the subject is assumed, and the occasion is given. But we must suppose something else that inclined him to create the subjects or arrange the occasion.
God's faithfulness (His inclination to keep His promises to His creatures) couldn't have been what moved Him to create the world. After all, you can't fulfill promises to creatures that don't exist yet. So keeping His promises couldn't have been His ultimate purpose in giving creatures their being. But after the world exists, after intelligent creatures are made, and God has bound Himself by promise to them, then His faithfulness can motivate His providential dealings with them. In this sense, exercising His faithfulness by fulfilling His promises can be the goal of many of God's works of providence. It can even be His ultimate end in a lower sense, because faithfulness and truth must be things God finds inherently attractive and delights in for their own sake. So God can have ultimate ends for particular works of providence (in this lower sense) that were not ultimate ends of creation itself.
This gives us two kinds of ultimate ends. We might call one type original and independent, the other consequential and dependent. The latter are still truly ultimate ends, because even though their appeal to God depends on certain things existing first, once those conditions are in place, these ends are attractive and valuable in themselves. Consider this: for a righteous Being, doing justice between two parties He's involved with is agreeable in itself, not merely as a means to some other end. Yet the desire to do justice between two parties is consequential on those parties existing and the occasion arising. Throughout the following discussion, when I speak of God's ultimate end in creating the world, I usually mean it in the highest sense: the original ultimate end.
Sixth, we can observe that the original ultimate end (or ends) of creation is what alone motivates God to establish the conditions for all subsequent ends through the initial act of creation and its original arrangement. The more original the end is, the more extensive and universal it becomes. Whatever God had primarily in view when creating and originally ordering the world must be constantly maintained and must govern all of God's works: everything He does toward His creatures.
Therefore, seventh, if we use the phrase "ultimate end" in this highest sense, then whatever is God's ultimate end in creating the world (assuming there is only one such end) must be what He makes His ultimate aim in all His works, in everything He does in both creation and providence. We must assume that in the use to which God puts His creatures, He always has regard for the end for which He made them. But if we take "ultimate end" in the other, lower sense, God may sometimes regard certain things as ultimate ends in particular works of providence that could not, in any proper sense, be His final end in creating the world.
Eighth, on the other hand, whatever appears to be God's ultimate end in any sense in His works of providence in general must also be the ultimate end of the work of creation itself. God may act for an end that is ultimate in a lower sense in some of His works of providence, which is not the ultimate end of the creation of the world, but this doesn't apply to the works of providence in general. God's works of providence in general are the same as the general use to which He puts the world He has made. We can reasonably argue from what we see of the general use God makes of the world to the general end for which He designed the world. There may be some ends of particular works of providence that weren't the last end of creation, which are in themselves pleasing to God in certain particular emerging circumstances, and so are last ends in an inferior sense. But this only happens in certain cases or particular occasions. However, if they are last ends of God's proceedings in the use of the world in general, this shows that His making them last ends doesn't depend on particular cases and circumstances, but on the nature of things in general and His general design in the being and constitution of the universe.
Ninth, if there is only one thing that is originally and independently of any future supposed cases agreeable to God, to be obtained by the creation of the world, then there can be only one last end of God's work in this highest sense. But if there are various things, properly distinct from one another, that are absolutely and independently agreeable to the Divine Being, which are actually obtained by the creation of the world, then there were several ultimate ends of creation in that highest sense.
