Conscience with the Power and Cases Thereof

To the Reader

I gladly remember the time when, as a young man, I heard the worthy Master Perkins preach before a great assembly of students. He instructed them soundly in the truth, effectively stirred them to seek godliness, and made them fit for the kingdom of God. By his own example he also showed them what they should chiefly pursue so that they might advance true religion in its power, for God’s glory and the salvation of others.

Among the other subjects he profitably preached, he eventually began to teach how, with “the tongue of the learned,” one might “speak a word in due season to him that is weary” (Isa 50:4), by diligently untangling and explaining what are called cases of conscience. The Lord found him doing so, like a faithful servant. Yet he left behind many who were devoted to that study and who, by their godly sermons and through God’s assistance, caused it to spread, increase, and be glorified throughout England.

Ever since then, my heart has been so set upon that study that I have considered it worthy to be pursued with every care by everyone. Later, when God’s good providence arranged for me to live outside my own country, I observed that this practical teaching was greatly lacking in various churches that were pure in both doctrine and order. I also saw that this deficiency was one of the chief causes of the serious neglect or carelessness shown toward certain duties that closely concern godliness and the Christian life.

My mind was impelled, almost violently, to try at least in private whether I could persuade some young men preparing for the ministry to apply themselves more fully to this practical treatment of theology, from which substantial fruit could be expected. Afterward, when I was called to the public responsibility of teaching at the university, I considered nothing better or more excellent than to lead students preparing for the ministry in this manner of teaching.

This part of preaching has so far been practiced less in the schools of the prophets because our leaders were necessarily compelled always to fight at the front against the enemies, defending the faith and purging the threshing floor of the church. Consequently, they could not plant and water the fields and vineyards as they wished, as commonly happens during fierce wars.

Meanwhile, they thought to themselves, as one writer of some note expresses it, “If we have the single and clear eye of the gospel, and if the lamp of pure faith is set upon a lampstand in the house of our heart, these small matters may easily be settled.” But experience has eventually taught us that neglecting this cultivation has produced a famine of godliness in many places, and from that famine has come a grievous spiritual plague. The counsel of Nehemiah therefore needs to be practiced: everyone should labor at this work with one hand while holding a spear or dart in the other to repel the violence of the enemies.

Experience has likewise taught that these small matters, if matters so necessary may be called small, are despised with no less madness than if someone allowed the fingers and toes of his hands and feet to be cut off as insignificant things, hoping that without them he could still walk and use his hands well enough.

Having weighed all these things carefully, I have undertaken, with God’s approval also, as I am persuaded, these instructions concerning the power of conscience. I do not hope that anything perfect in this field can come from me, for there are more kinds of cases than certain answers can be given to each of them, at least by me. My purpose is rather to do something by which the unlearned and those without better assistance may receive some help, and by which the more learned may be encouraged to publish something more perfect and exact.

The godly, learned, and venerable preachers of long experience are especially responsible for this duty. Their daily work is to deal with human consciences, and through experience they have learned far better which questions most often cause the conscience to doubt and from which principles those questions may best be resolved. Such matters cannot easily be understood as well by someone who lives privately in an academic profession.

Indeed, if these subjects were discussed in meetings of preachers according to the variety of cases that arise, and if the more noteworthy decisions were put into writing, the children of Israel would not need to go down to the Philistines. That is, our students would not need to resort to Roman Catholic authors so that each might sharpen his plowshare, mattock, axe, or weeding hook, as happened in the extreme necessity of God’s people (1 Sam 13:20).

Furthermore, if those preparing for the ministry were first instructed in these matters and were seriously examined in them before being ordained, we might reasonably hope to have both preachers and churches more after the heart of God and Christ than we now have.

The Roman Catholics have labored extensively in this field to instruct their confessors. Amid a great mass of earth and the filth of superstitions, they have some veins of silver, from which I believe I have drawn some things that should not be despised. But they lack the life of this doctrine, and death is in their pot. The subject itself requires that other things be taught by others, and that the same things be taught in another manner. I have attempted to accomplish this in part, and I do not doubt that others will also undertake it.

Here I follow the same method I used in my Marrow of Divinity. The last three of these books provide a full exposition of the second part of that work. This was perhaps what those people expected who insistently demanded, almost with daily reproaches, that the publication of this treatise be hastened.

But at last, to bring my preface to an end, I will sum up many things in a few words, using the words of William of Paris:

“Concerning these matters, we have left many things unwritten because of lack of skill, many because of other necessary business, many because of dullness, many for fear of being tedious, and many more because of our sins, which above all hinder both us and others in such things. We do not doubt that we are exposed to the danger of slanderous backbiters. But by doing what we can, we have given wise men a suitable occasion, and we have set forth, not the dry, sandy ground of fruitless disputes, but a most profitable and wholesome place for minds to exercise themselves.”

W. Ames

Book One: Conscience and Its Cases

The Definition of Conscience

The conscience of a human being, for I do not intend to treat the conscience of angels, is a person’s judgment of himself according to God’s judgment of him. “Judge, I pray you, between me and my vineyard” (Isa 5:3). “If we would judge ourselves, we should not be judged,” etc. (1 Cor 11:31).

1. I call conscience a judgment, first, to show that it belongs to the understanding, not to the will. The very name of conscience suggests this. The proof is that every action Scripture attributes to human conscience properly belongs to the rational power or faculty. Nevertheless, the will, by some act or inclination, can both command the understanding to judge and follow that judgment. Some call this inclination conscience, and others call it a part of conscience, but neither is correct.

2. Since conscience is classified as judgment, it is distinguished from the mere apprehension of truth. Conscience always presupposes firm and settled assent.

3. The definition of conscience shows that it is not a contemplative judgment, by which truth is simply distinguished from falsehood. It is a practical judgment, by which what a person knows is specifically applied to what is good or evil for him, so that it may serve as an inward rule directing his will.

Because the term judgment sometimes means a power or faculty, sometimes a habit, and sometimes an act, the question arises: Which of these is conscience properly?

4. The highly respected theologian William Perkins, the only one of our countrymen to publish a distinct treatise on conscience, places it among the faculties. In defining its general nature, he calls it a part of the understanding, which he explains as “a natural power or faculty.” He supports his opinion by arguing that acts such as accusing, comforting, and terrifying could not be ascribed to conscience if conscience itself were an act.

But this argument is weak, because Scripture attributes such effects to thoughts themselves, and thoughts are undoubtedly acts: “Their thoughts accusing one another, or excusing” (Rom 2:15). The reason is that what is done is the effect not only of the mover but also of the movement itself. Moreover, Master Perkins places conscience, understanding, opinion, knowledge, faith, and prudence in the same category, yet no one would define these as distinct faculties of the soul.

5. Some of the scholastics, including Scotus, Bonaventure, and Durand, maintain that conscience is a habit. This might be granted concerning some part of conscience, or its principles, but it cannot be granted without qualification concerning everything signified by the name conscience. The sole function of a habit, considered simply as a habit, is “to incline one to act readily.” Conscience, however, has other operations that properly belong to it, such as accusing and comforting.

6. Therefore, by judgment in the definition of conscience, I mean, most properly and in agreement with the best scholastics, an act of practical judgment that proceeds from the understanding through the power or means of a habit.

7. Acts of judgment consist either in simple apprehension or in reasoning. This raises the question of which kind conscience belongs to.

[Answer:]

It belongs to judgment by reasoning, because conscience cannot perform its acts of accusing, excusing, and comforting except through some third argument. The force of that argument appears only in a syllogism, through what is inferred and concluded from it.

8. The force and nature of conscience, therefore, are contained in a syllogism such as this:

Proposition, or major premise: Whoever lives in sin will die.

Assumption, or minor premise: I live in sin.

Conclusion: Therefore, I will die.

Or this:

Proposition, or major premise: Whoever believes in Christ will not die but live.

Assumption, or minor premise: I believe in Christ.

Conclusion: Therefore, I will not die but live.

9. With respect to the proposition, conscience is called a light and a law. With respect to the assumption and conclusion, it is called a witness. More specifically, with respect to the assumption it is most fittingly called an index or a book, and with respect to the conclusion it is most properly called a judge.

10. What dictates or supplies the proposition is called synteresis, or, by the scholastics, synderesis. The assumption is especially and properly called syneidesis. The conclusion is the krisis, or judgment.

11. Many other syllogisms belong to conscience, either because they prove the proposition of such a principal syllogism or because they illustrate the conclusion itself. Yet the whole nature of conscience is contained in that principal syllogism alone. The proposition concerns the law. The assumption concerns the deed or state. The conclusion concerns the relation that arises from that deed or state with respect to the law. The conclusion either pronounces a person guilty or gives spiritual peace and security.

Synteresis and Moral Principles

1. Synteresis, from which the proposition of this syllogism, or the law of conscience, is taken, is most properly a habit of the understanding. By it we assent to the principles of moral actions, that is, actions that are our duty because God has willed or commanded them. Its Greek name comes from the idea of preserving, for through God’s goodness, the knowledge of many things we ought to do or avoid is still preserved in the human mind even after the fall.

Durand’s explanation, in which he imagines that the Greek word synteresis signifies a gathering together, is too strained and absurd.

2. Because synteresis is a habit, many call conscience a habit. But synteresis is only the principle of conscience. It does not constitute any part of conscience except when conscience is in operation.

3. Synteresis is called a natural habit with respect to the light by which the human understanding is fitted to assent to natural principles. It is also called an acquired habit with respect to the species, or the fuller understanding, of that which the understanding is naturally enabled to grasp and can, as it were, understand immediately.

4. Synteresis differs from the law of nature, or from that law of God naturally written in every human heart, only with respect to apprehension. The law is the object, while synteresis is the object as apprehended, or the apprehension of that object.

5. Synteresis may be hindered from acting for a time, but it cannot be utterly extinguished or lost. Therefore, no one is so desperately wicked as to be entirely without conscience.

6. When synteresis is understood in a broad sense, it includes not only general conclusions concerning right or law that are deduced by sound reasoning from natural principles, but also every practical truth to which we firmly assent through the revelation we have received by faith.

7. From this arises the distinction between natural and enlightened conscience. Natural conscience acknowledges as law the principles of nature and the conclusions arising from them. Enlightened conscience acknowledges these and, in addition, everything prescribed in Scripture. Scripture sometimes speaks of enlightened conscience (Rom 6:3) and sometimes of natural conscience (1 Cor 6:8).

8. From this it is evident that the perfect and only rule of conscience is the revealed will of God, by which a person’s duty is both shown and commanded. Synteresis in its broader sense consists partly of the moral principles naturally within us, together with their conclusions, and partly of those things God has additionally commanded. But God’s revealed will, by which a person knows his duty, contains both.

9. Therefore, only the law of God binds the human conscience. By the law of God we mean the revealed will of God already mentioned, including those things commanded in the gospel.

10. To bind, in this moral sense, is to possess such authority that the conscience ought to submit to it and that acting contrary to it would be a sin.

11. Therefore, although people are bound in conscience by God to observe human laws under due and just circumstances, those laws, insofar as they are merely human laws, do not bind the conscience.

12. The conscience is immediately subject to God and his will. It therefore cannot submit itself to any creature without idolatry.

13. God alone knows the conscience’s inward workings. Therefore, he alone can prescribe a law to it or bind it by one.

14. God alone can punish the conscience when it sins. Therefore, he alone can forbid anything to it.

15. Even a promise, which is sacred in itself, does not properly bind the conscience merely as a human act, though it is confirmed by an oath. This follows from the reasons already given, although people are bound in conscience by God to keep their promises strictly and faithfully. What has been said about human laws may also, in a certain respect, be said of every covenant and other condition people establish. Once such an agreement is made, a person is bound to keep it out of conscience toward God.

For example, a sick person is bound in conscience to follow physicians’ advice for the sake of health, but the remedies prescribed by physicians do not bind the conscience. Likewise, parents and children are bound to their mutual duties, and anyone who has received a benefit is bound to show gratitude. The same may be said of many other things. Yet neither a parent, a benefactor, a relationship, nor a benefit binds the conscience in itself. It is God’s will expressed through these things that binds it.

The Work of Conscience

1. The work of conscience, considered with respect to its synteresis or laws, is one thing in necessary matters and another in matters that are intermediate and indifferent. In necessary matters, conscience has two acts: first, to bind; second, to compel obedience.

2. Conscience binds according to how it is informed of God’s will, for it possesses the authority of God’s will within itself and therefore stands in the place of God himself.

3. God’s will, insofar as it is understood or may be understood, binds the conscience to assent. Insofar as conscience acknowledges and receives it, God’s will binds the whole person to obey and carry it out immediately.

4. Conscience binds a person so strictly that no creature’s command can release that person from it.

5. Therefore, insofar as a person conscientiously recognizes God’s will commanding a duty, Scripture calls that person a debtor (Rom 1:14) and a servant (Rom 6:16). Such a person is said to be bound (Acts 20:22), constrained (2 Cor 5:14), and “to haue a necessity laid upon him” (1 Cor 9:16), so that he cannot do otherwise (Acts 4:20).

6. Conscience compels obedience by virtue of its act of binding. That binding is an impulsive cause acting upon the will, moving it to conduct itself conscientiously.

7. This compulsion is signified by the passages and expressions just cited. Its strength and power are declared in these words: “Wherefore I thought from henceforth not to speake of him, nor to preach any more in his name, but the word of the Lord, was a very Burning fire in my heart, and in my bones” (Jer 20:9). Again, “The Lion hath roared, who will not be afraid? the Lord hath spoken who can but Prophesy?” (Amos 3:8). And elsewhere, “his spirit was stirred in him” (Acts 17:16).

8. If a person has a settled disposition of the will that consents to this urging of conscience, the two together constitute a morally good conscience.

9. In indifferent matters, conscience likewise has two actions and duties: first, to discern; second, to direct.

10. To discern is to show and declare the differences among things, identifying what is necessary, what is free, what is lawful, and what is unlawful.

11. To direct is to order lawful actions toward a good end, with proper regard for their circumstances.

12. The ends that must always be sought, even in indifferent matters, are the glory of God, the edification of our neighbor, and assistance in our necessary actions.

13. The power of this direction is so great that it makes an action good when the action is indifferent in its own nature. Conversely, not only an evil direction, but even the absence of a good direction, makes that same action bad.

An Erroneous Conscience

Several important questions arise concerning this teaching about the first acts and offices of conscience. Because they are essential for directing our actions rightly throughout life, they must be addressed here, though briefly.

Question 1: Does an Erroneous Conscience Bind?

Answer: To explain this question properly, five matters must first be considered briefly: what an erroneous conscience is, what matters it concerns, where its error comes from, the general differences among such errors, and the several ways in which conscience binds.

1. An erroneous conscience may be understood negatively, in contrast to a good conscience. In this sense it includes every conscience that fails to judge rightly when it ought, including a doubtful or scrupulous conscience. It may also be understood positively, meaning only a conscience that judges a thing to be otherwise than it really is. This kind of erroneous conscience differs from a doubtful or scrupulous conscience because it gives firm assent, though it errs in doing so. In this question we are speaking of a conscience that errs in this positive sense.

2. Some principles are so clear and so firmly written in everyone’s heart that people cannot err when obeying and practicing them. Examples include, “God ought to be loved,” and, “Perjury ought to be avoided.” No one’s conscience can err concerning such things or act upon them against conscience. A person cannot love God against his conscience, for example. Conscience therefore errs properly about conclusions drawn from such principles.

3. Error of conscience arises because particular conclusions are not rightly drawn from general principles, because the things God commands us in Scripture to believe are not sufficiently understood, or because the assent of faith is not given to things that ought to be believed even though they are understood. Besides God’s secret judgments, the cause is either failure to consider what ought to be considered or some evil disposition that prevents the mind from making a proper inquiry or turns it away from judging rightly.

4. An error of conscience concerns either an act or the rule governing it. An error concerning the rule may arise after the act has been done or before it. Before an act, error concerning the rule consists in judging an unlawful act to be lawful, a lawful act to be unlawful, or something to be a binding duty when it is either unlawful or merely permitted.

5. Some distinguish between binding someone to a thing (obligare) and simply binding someone (ligare). Conscience is said to bind someone to a thing when it is sinful not only to act against conscience but also to fail to act according to it. Conscience is said simply to bind when a person cannot lawfully do something while his conscience judges it as it does. He will sin if he acts against conscience, yet he will also sin if he acts according to it. The meaning of this distinction may be approved, though its authors must answer for the terms they chose.

Some further distinguish binding to a thing according to the object involved. They say a person is bound either to act according to his erroneous conscience or to lay that conscience aside. But this distinction is not exact, because conscience binds only insofar as it dictates or declares something. While a conscience remains in error, it never declares that its error must be abandoned or that it should itself be disregarded because it is erroneous.

Others distinguish between the obligation to do what conscience commands and the obligation not to do the contrary. But this distinction is not always sound either. If a person’s conscience told him that he might lie to save his life, he would have either to lie or necessarily to act against his conscience.

6. From these principles the question may be answered as follows. First, even an erroneous conscience always binds in the sense that whoever acts against it sins. The reason is that whoever acts against conscience acts against God’s will, not materially and truly, but formally and by interpretation, because conscience declares what it declares as the will of God.

For example, suppose someone insults a private citizen while believing him to be the king rather than a private citizen. His action is interpreted and judged as having been done to the king himself. In the same way, whoever despises conscience despises God himself, because what conscience dictates is assumed to be God’s will. This is why a person always sins when acting against conscience.

If conscience does not err, and the matter truly is as conscience judges it to be, the person sins in two ways: first, by doing what is evil in itself, and second, by doing it in an evil manner. The act is evil by its own nature and also because it involves contempt for conscience. But if conscience errs, what the person does is not evil in itself, though it is done in an evil manner. In that case the evil consists solely in contempt for conscience.

7. An error of conscience concerning an act, that is, concerning the object or matter upon which an action is to be exercised, is either involuntary and blameless or voluntary and blameworthy. If it is involuntary and blameless, conscience binds a person to act as fully as it would if it were not mistaken.

For example, if someone sincerely believes that an object belonging to another person is his own, he may and ought in conscience to use it as his own. If someone sincerely believes a tyrant to be his prince, or a usurper of the title to be a lawful magistrate, he is bound to give him the obedience that is due. We have an example of this in Jacob, who went in to Leah, who was not his wife, sincerely believing that she was his wife Rachel.

8. If the error is voluntary, it must be judged in the same way as an error concerning the law or rule.

9. A conscience that errs concerning the law after the act, either by believing that something done rightly was sinful or that something sinful was done rightly, has no power to bind with respect to that past action. Binding and obligating always concern future actions, and a moral action, like the will itself, is always guided and formed by an apprehension that precedes it, not by one that follows it. Therefore, no action is made better or worse by a judgment of conscience that comes afterward.

Yet such a conscience does bind a person, on account of what was done, so that he cannot lawfully continue doing the same thing while his conscience remains persuaded that he sinned in doing it before, even though in fact he did not.

10. Suppose an erroneous conscience judges an unlawful act to be lawful, such as lying to save one’s own life or a neighbor’s. That conscience binds, but it does not bind the person to commit the act. It binds because someone with such a conscience can neither lie nor abstain from lying without sin. He cannot lie because lying is simply unlawful. He cannot abstain from lying with such a conscience because abstaining in that manner is forbidden by God, even though the abstinence itself is commanded. God requires not only that we do good and refrain from evil, but also that we do both with a good conscience rather than a bad one.

Such a conscience does not bind a person to do what it prescribes. First, there can be no obligation to do unlawful things. Second, conscience binds someone to act only by virtue of a command from God, but such a conscience is not founded upon any command, for God’s law can neither incline nor bind anyone to sin. Third, this error is always a sin, but a sin does not bind anyone to practice it. Fourth, such a conscience is never founded so securely that further examination and inquiry are unnecessary. Fifth, a person is bound to lay aside such a conscience. Although some do not speak precisely enough when they say that such a conscience binds a person to lay itself aside, it is nevertheless certain that a person is obligated to lay aside an erroneous conscience, for it is part of the old self whom we are commanded to put off (Eph 4:22).

11. A conscience that judges a lawful act to be unlawful binds a person to abstain from practicing or using it (Rom 14:23). The reason is that one may abstain from lawful things without sin.

12. A conscience that judges an unlawful act to be a binding duty binds, but not to the practice of that act, for the reasons given in proposition 10.

13. A conscience that judges something merely lawful to be a binding duty binds a person to practice it. For example, if someone’s conscience tells him that he must always uncover his hands when praying publicly, he must pray in that manner, because lawful practices may be observed consistently without sin.

Objection

If an erroneous conscience binds in such a way that we can neither follow it nor refuse to follow it without sin, then those who err in this way are under a kind of necessity to sin. This seems inconsistent with the equity of God’s law.

Answer

1. The necessity of sinning when someone is entangled by his own erroneous conscience is not the same in both directions, whether he acts according to conscience or against it. If he acts according to his erroneous conscience, the sin lies in the action done. If he acts against it, the sin lies in the manner of doing it.

2. This necessity is not absolute but conditional. It exists only if the person retains such a conscience, which he both may and ought to lay aside.

3. This necessity does not arise from the nature of God’s law. It is contracted and continued through human sin, for no one is entangled in this way without his own fault.

Question 2: Is It Worse to Follow an Erroneous Conscience or to Act Against It?

Answer: We must judge the seriousness of a sin according to the nature of the thing to be done or omitted, both as it is in itself and as we understand it.

Suppose someone erroneously considers it unlawful to go to church and serve God there, though he is otherwise obligated to do so, because he knows the preacher to be a wicked man and thinks that by attending he will share in the preacher’s wickedness. His sin is greater if he stays away than if he attends, because neglecting God’s service is a greater sin than sharing in another person’s individual wickedness within that service.

But suppose he believes it unlawful to attend the sacred duties because he judges that idolatry will be committed there. He would sin more grievously by attending, because idolatry is a greater sin than neglecting true worship.

In the first case, the person who follows his conscience sins more than the person who acts against it. In the second, the person who acts against conscience commits the greater sin. Therefore, no certain and universal rule can be given in this matter.

Opinion and Doubt in Conscience

Question 1: May a Person Be Satisfied with a Doubting Conscience?

Answer: To explain this question, we should note that opinion sometimes means a definite and settled judgment without any doubt. It is a definite judgment arising not from sense, knowledge, or true faith, but from reason. Sometimes the term is used more strictly for a judgment by which we do assent to the truth of something, though not without suspicion, fear, or doubt that it might be otherwise.

On the basis of this distinction, I answer as follows.

1. In matters necessary to salvation and the worship of God, no opinion is sufficient, however great its rational certainty may be. Faith is required in these matters, and faith rests only upon the infallible Word of God.

2. In matters more remote from their principles, we must diligently seek to obtain a settled persuasion or belief from Scripture. But if this cannot be obtained, it is lawful in our actions to follow an opinion that is certain and has been tested by the rule of Scripture.

3. If we use every diligence to attain certainty, even when we have not attained it, it is lawful in many matters to follow the opinion that is most probable.

4. It is never lawful to act against our own opinion, whether certain or probable, merely out of respect for the authority of others.

5. No one can hold two contrary probable opinions concerning the same matter at the same time in such a way that he may lawfully abandon either one and follow the other.

Question 2: What Should Someone Do When His Conscience Is Doubtful?

Answer: To explain this question, we must first observe that conscience is said to be doubtful in a broad sense when the assent of faith or opinion prevails, yet some doubt remains with it. Strictly and properly, however, a conscience is called doubtful when it yields to neither side of the question at hand but hesitates and wavers between assent and dissent, not knowing which course to take.

The first kind of doubt has been discussed partly in the preceding question and will be discussed partly in the question that follows. Here we are treating the conscience that is called doubtful in the proper and strict sense.

Second, doubt is either speculative or practical. Speculative doubt does not immediately concern a practice or action, as when someone doubts whether a particular thing belongs to him. Practical doubt immediately concerns a particular action.

With these distinctions established, the answer is as follows.