On the Generation of the Divine Word

I. Who has bewitched your great understanding, O noble Candidus? To speak of God is an audacity beyond man. But since there has been implanted in our soul a nous, mind ἠθικὸς, and a spirit sent from above for the formations of the understandings inscribed from eternity in our soul: it stirs ineffable things toward the investigable mysteries of God's wills and operations, as a kind of exaltation of our soul's mind. For it wishes to see, and even now, placed in such a body, that which is difficult to understand alone, and impossible to declare. For the blessed Paul says: O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God, how unsearchable are the judgments of God, and his ways past finding out! Isaiah also says: Who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counsellor? You see, therefore, at what cost the knowledge of God is obtained.

But since you write so boldly about the divine generation: we too will show you first from the scriptures the eternal generation of the Son of the Lord Jesus Christ. Or do you think the scriptures we read are vain? If anyone is a Christian in name as well as in fact, he must needs venerate the scriptures, which proclaim the Lord Jesus Christ. If therefore it is necessary for you to receive the scriptures, it is also necessary that the things which are said in them about Christ you should receive and believe just as they are said. Now they say that Jesus Christ is the only-begotten Son of God, as the prophet David says: Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee.

And the Apostle Paul: Because he spared not his own Son. And again: Blessed be God and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. Then also Jesus Christ himself frequently says: I and the Father are one. And: He that seeth me seeth also my Father. And: I am in the Father, and the Father is in me. Saying these things, he was God, if he did not lie: but if he lied, then the work of God is not in every way perfect. Often and many and a thousand times these things are said: does it not appear to you that they are said thus everywhere?

II. Hear another thing from us. We say that God is our Father, and that in the highest degree. What is the reason, and according to what? Because, I say, in charity he predestinated us unto adoption through Christ. Does God have Christ also as a son through adoption? No one has dared to say this: perhaps not even you. Do you see what kind of blasphemy arises from this saying? We say that we are heirs to God the Father, and heirs through Christ, being sons through adoption: and that Christ is the true Son, through whom it is brought about for us to be sons and co-heirs in Christ himself. You have said many things about Christ that are true and as they stand: that he is the power of God, and omnipotent, and the universal λόγος, and all operation, and all life, and many other things. Did he then attain goods of this kind, having been made from those things which are not? And is that blessed which does not come from that which truly is?

The understanding that conceives thus is without God, sacrilegious and full of blasphemy. The Lord himself is above all things that are, and all things that are not. And so if he himself, as is said, was made from those things which are not, will he himself be able to make all things that are from those things which are not? Nevertheless we believe God to be that which is and always is, not that which at some time was not. He bestows, therefore, that which is, and bestows through ineffable generation, and bestows existence, νοῦν, life: not as one who is these things, but as above these things and always all things. If therefore God is not that which is not, but is above that which is, truly ὤν, the power of τοῦ ὄντος itself, which, stirred into generation by operation, by an unutterable movement begat τὸν ὄντα, perfect in all ways, the whole from the whole of power. God therefore is the whole πρόον: but Jesus is this very whole ὄν, yet now in existence and life and understanding, the universal τέλεον ὄν in every way.

This is the end, this the beginning, this the Son, this the πᾶς λόγος, this he who is the λόγος with God and in God, this is Jesus Christ, before all things that are and that truly are; the first and all existence, the first and all understanding, the first and in every way τέλεον ὄν, the very first ὄν, the name before all names; for from him are all names, as will be declared.

III. But I wish to hear, O my dearest Candidus, what you think that which is not to be. For if God is the cause of all things, he is the cause both of that to which being belongs and of that to which being does not belong. But if he is the cause, he is not that which is not. For the cause is as ὄν: since it is that from which and by which that shall be ὄν to which ὄν is to come. And by this very fact, the cause is truly above ὄν. That therefore which is not yet ὄν, that is, which is not; toward this, ὄν is the cause. Therefore it is called πρόον: and according to this reasoning God is the cause both of those things that are and of those things that are not.

IV. That which is not must therefore be defined: which indeed is understood and named in four ways: according to negation absolutely and in every way, so that it is the privation of what exists: according to the nature of one thing in relation to the nature of another, so that this is not that: according to not yet being, which is to be and can be: according to that which, being above all things that are, has being; so that because it is not any of those things, it agrees with none of them. What then do we say God is? τὸ ὄν, or τὸ μὴ ὄν? But we certainly call him ὄν: because he is the father of those things that are. But the father of those things that are is not τὸ ὄν, if those things of which he is father do not yet exist. It is not permitted to say this, it is impious to understand that the cause of things that are should be called μὴ ὄν. For the cause is prior to those things of which it is the cause.

God therefore is the supreme ὄν; and according to what is supreme, God is called μὴ ὄν: not through privation of all that he is, but as being himself another ὄν, which is μὴ ὄν: with respect to those things that are to be, τὸ μὴ ὄν: with respect to what he is as cause toward the generation of those things that are, τὸ ὄν.

V. It is therefore true to say that God the Father is τοῦ ὄν, according to the cause of those things that are and of those things that are not. By the will of God, therefore, both those things that are and those things that are not come into generation. And do not suppose that those things which are not are so as through privation of those things that are. For none of these either exists or is understood. For if the world and all supernal things subsist, all things both are. For there is no μὴ ὄν according to privation; but there is a certain sub-understanding, derived from those things that are; to sub-understand their privation, not of something subsisting, not even of the sub-understanding itself, nor existing in the way that those things which are exist. But certain things that are not are in some way, such as those very things which now are: which after generation both are and are called, and before generation were either in their own potency or in idea.

But whence or from what were they generated? According to those modes, namely; according to the nature of one thing in relation to another, and according to that which is not yet, which is to be and can be.

VI. First, therefore, God is both above those things that are and above those things that are not: inasmuch as he is their generator and father, according to what he is as cause. Then, according to generation from God or according to making, those things that are appeared. And the μὴ ὄντα also appeared. But of those things that are, some are those that truly are, others are those that are, others are those that are not truly not, others are those that are not. But those that truly are not, the fullness of God does not receive into being. For according to what it is to be, and what it is to be in some manner, is the fullness of God. For the fullness is τῇ μόνῃ ἐμφάσει existing in the understanding of those things that truly are not: which according to subjection, from those things that are not truly. Yet in some manner nous, mind, beginning all things, formed an image concerning that which truly is not. VII. Hear how I say this.

There are certain things of this kind, which are manifest by nature, such as those that are and all supercœlestial things: as τὸ πνεῦμα, καὶ ὁ nous, mind, ἡ psyche, soul, τὸ νόημα, ἡ παιδεία, ἡ ἀρετή, ὁ λόγος, opinion, perfection, judgment, life, understanding: and still higher, existentiality, vitality, intelligentiality: and still above all these, ὃν μόνον: and that which is ὅ ἐστι ἓν μόνον ὄν. If our nous, mind rightly enters into these, it comprehends them and is formed by them: and understanding stands firm, no longer existing in the confusion of inquiry. But since such understanding is of another, a certain comprehension and definition is effected. We understand certain ὄντα to be only ὄντα: because in the fact that whatever is such is of another and is other, as the intellectual is to the intelligible. Therefore the intelligibles are those that truly are: others that merely are, are intellectuals. But all these are in the nature of souls that are intellectual, not yet having understanding; which are, but are fitted for understanding.

For nous, mind, aroused in the soul, illumines and enlightens the intellectual power of the soul and makes it intellectual and forms it: and understanding and perfection are born in the soul. For this reason the soul is also called substance, since every substance is a subject. But a subject underlies something else: and the soul underlies τῷ νόει, and ἡ ὕπαρξις τῆς ψυχῆς underlies πνεύματι ἁγίῳ. The soul therefore is substance. VIII. All things therefore that belong to the soul are only ὄντα, not those that truly are. The soul therefore comprehends those that truly are: because if nous, mind enters into the intellectual soul, it comprehends likewise also ὄντα ἀληθῶς: for the soul understands that it is a soul: and thus from those things ἀληθῶς ὄντα εἰσί, understanding of those things that are is effected. But indeed the others, those that are not truly not, and those that are not, take their understanding from these through the conversion of the understanding of τοῦ ὄντος. For τὸ μὴ ὄν is not understood according to what it is as non-being: but τὸ μὴ ὄν is understood according to τὸ ὄν. τὸ μὴ ὄν is therefore taken as a certain elimination of τοῦ ὄντος.

But elimination is something unformed, and is not as ὄν. For every τὸ ὄν in existence or quality is formed and shaped. But the unformed is a certain something: therefore τὸ μὴ ὄν is in some way something. τὰ μὴ ὄντα therefore are: and therefore also those that truly are not exist: and those that are not truly not are more powerful toward that which is to be than those that are μὴ ὄντα. On account of which a certain natural order of τῶν ὄντων of τοῦ ὄντος is effected, τὰ ὄντα. IX. We have therefore spoken of those that are, and also of those that truly are. Let us now say what those are that truly are not, and what those are that are not. Since the essence and power of God is intelligible and intellectual, all things that are appeared according to understanding. But understanding operates in two ways: by its own proper intellectual power, and according to the limitation of understanding, also by sense.

But sense again, since it is a likeness of the understood and a limitation of understanding, if it perfectly perceives the operation of the understanding which strengthens it in operating and acting, sense becomes near and close to pure understanding. And this is that which comprehends heavenly things, and those things that are in the aether, and those that are born and reborn in nature and in ὕλῃ, and other things of this kind whose power is in sensual understanding: and that being is in some way being and not being. For heaven, and all things in it, and the whole world consisting of ὕλῃ and form, is in a mixture: therefore it is not simply. Of this world therefore, those parts which are, participating in the power and nature of the intellectual soul, are in the nature of those things that are not truly not. For they use understanding, but understanding according to sense, and are according to sense mutable and changeable, but according to understanding immutable and unchangeable. But how does sense apprehend this?

But it apprehends nothing except qualities; substance however, that is the subject, it neither perceives nor apprehends: for qualities are mutable; substance however is immutable. But although the soul is substance, yet it is mutable. How is this? Take it thus.

X. When the soul receives and understands the things that are in the world, if it understands those things which are animate and ensouled; in the fact of having a soul, there are things which are not truly non-existent. For in one sense they are μὴ ὄντα, insofar as they have a soul; in another sense μὴ ὄντα insofar as they have a mutable ὕλη and changeable qualities: and these things we have described are μὴ ὄντως μὴ ὄντα. But when we understand ὕλη as being beneath the soul (I mean by ὕλη in the soul, whatever exists without an intellectual soul, taking the term in a transferred sense), the soul comprehends around qualities things that are as it were μὴ ὄντα: for qualities are changeable, and in this respect they are μὴ ὄντα. Indeed the very substrate which is called ὕλη is indeterminate, and for this reason is said to be without quality. But if it is determined, it is called quality, and not ὕλη as such. Yet there are primary qualities in primary bodies—fire, air, water, earth—which exist, but by themselves, without mixture or union with anything else.

For if these are qualities, and these are ὕλη, then qualities are therefore ὕλη. For quality does not happen to ὕλη as an accident; rather it itself is quality: for quality cannot exist by itself through itself, but by the very fact that it exists, it is ὕλη. And since it is always ὑλική, it is nothing other than ὕλη. Just as the soul also, insofar as it is intellectual, is soul; and insofar as it is always moved and moves itself from itself, not according to duplication nor according to accident, that soul exists, but because these qualities are its substance, the soul is substance. So likewise ὕλη itself is quality, itself is substance as ὕλη. Yet the soul differs from ὕλη. For some say that the soul is ὕλη; that the substrate and the quality are the same substance, and that substance and soul and ὕλη are the same. But it differs, as I said: because the soul, being intellectual, understands itself. But ὕλη, though in every way understanding, has neither understanding nor any sense in sense.

And therefore the soul is among the things that are: when it is alone and pure, it belongs to those things that are; but when mixed with ὕλη, it belongs to those things which are not truly non-existent. But ὕλη alone is the nurse of all things that are not. The soul however, together with ὕλη, is the nurse of all things, but the soul by its own power is the nurse of all things and the generator of life; whereas ὕλη without the soul, having become exhausted and dense, remains in eternity, receiving animation from the soul. These things therefore both are and are called μὴ ὄντα. Concerning those things which are not, the matter stands thus.

XI. You have therefore four: those which truly are, those which are, those which are not truly non-existent, and those which are not. But by conversion and combination of these terms, two further modes are implied: those which are not truly, and those which truly are not. Yet those which are not truly signify only those things which are: for they only are, those which are not truly. But those which truly are not have no place for being. For since God fills all things, it is impious and impossible that those which truly are not should either be spoken of or exist: these differ from one another by understanding alone, as we have declared, not from those which are not, but from those which are; they arise in the soul according to privation, with those which truly are not being placed neither in their own substance nor in understanding.

XII. Let us therefore proceed to see what God is, and among which things he exists. Those things which are truly first and most honorable—is God among them? But he is also the cause of these, and their giver and father. Nor can it be said that he himself is those things to which he gave existence. For since he is one and alone, he willed that they should be made like him; and not that they themselves should be that one: but that which is to be one, this he willed the many themselves to be. Perhaps you will say, O Candidus, this argument is mine: and according to this reasoning I say that the Son of God was born from those things which are not, according to election, not according to generation. But the μὴ ὄντα which we said exist—are they those things which are altogether non-existent?

But it is already agreed that they are not; it is also agreed that those things which are not are spoken of according to four modes: of which two are according to absolute nothingness and according to that which is above all things; but the others are according to the nature of something else, and according to that which does not yet exist; and yet it has the potentiality for being, and does not yet exist in actuality.

XIII. What then is God, if he is not even one of those which truly are, nor those which are, nor those which are not truly non-existent, nor those which are not? For God bestows these as their cause upon all of them. But to suppose that God belongs to those which truly are not is impious. For we necessarily speak of God by preeminence and eminence above τῶν ὄντων, above all existence, above all life, above all knowledge, above every ὄν, and as the ὄν of πάντων ὄντων: indeed as unintelligible, infinite, invisible, without intellect, without substance, unknowable: and as that which, though above all things, is yet nothing of those things which are: and because it is above those things which are, it is nothing of those things which are: God therefore is μὴ ὄν.

XIV. But what is this τὸ μὴ ὄν that is above τὸ ὄν? It is to be understood neither as ὄν nor as μὴ ὄν altogether: but as intelligible in unknowing, both as ὄν and as μὴ ὄν; which by its own power alone brought τὸ ὄν into manifestation and begot it. And there is a λόγος that this is so. But what did God, who is above ὄν, produce from what he himself is, as he himself is, as ὄντα? Was it from another? Or from nothing? From another? But from what other? For nothing existed before God. Nor from another as from a God, since nothing is equal to him. From nothing? But how? For if he produced τὸ ὄν, it is true to say that from himself, who is above τὸ ὄν, he generated τὸ ὄν rather than from nothing. For that which is first above τὸ ὄν is hidden ὄν. But the manifestation of what is hidden is generation. Indeed potentiality as ὄν generates actuality as ὄν: for nothing in generation is without cause.

And if God is the cause of all things, he is also the cause of τοῦ ὄντος coming into generation: since he is above τὸ ὄν, being nearer to τῷ ὄντι, and as its father and begetter. For a pregnant woman carries hidden within her what she is about to bring forth. For the offspring is not non-existent before birth, but is in hiddenness: and through generation it comes into manifestation as ὄν in actuality, which had been ὄν in potentiality. And, to say what is true, ὄν in actuality of τοῦ ὄντος—for it generates outwardly in actuality. But what does it generate? What was within. But what was within God? Nothing other than ὄν; truly τὸ ὄν: or rather πρόον, which is ὑπεράνω τοῦ παντὸς ὄντος: the genus, I say, which is being above the beings of being, ὄν now with potentiality in actuality. This is Jesus Christ. For he himself said: If they ask, Who sent you? Say, ὁ ὤν. For that alone which is always ὄν, is ὁ ὤν.

XV. The Son therefore, Jesus Christ, is τὰ μὲν ὄντα, and the only-begotten Son: because that πρόον generated nothing other than ὄν before all things and ὄν perfect in every way; which cannot exist together with another, and because that which is perfect in every way has no need of another. For the universal ὄν, and the sole ὄν, and the one and above-the-universal-genus ὄν, is one and the sole ὄν. But because this ὄν is not that ὄν which has perfect potentiality, that ὄν was born by potentiality, before all things which truly are, and which are the ἀρχαῖα ὄντα, ἀφ' ὧν πάντα εἰσί. He is, I say, from whom are all things that are, and through whom, and in whom. For this reason the ὄν which exists in actuality is the image of that τοῦ ὄντος which exists in potentiality, remaining always in itself according to no progression.

XVI. What then follows? We say that Jesus is τὸ ὄν first, ὄν before all things, through whom are all things that are. For this is the name above every name: for the beginning of names is τὸ ὄν, and the beginning of substances, as I have frequently declared in many places. Again we say that Jesus Christ is τὸ ὂν naturally around God, and more so and in the beginning the λόγος, and that this very λόγος is God. Then through three περιοχίδια John declares the αἰώνιοι things which we confess: and we say that this is so. For it has been said that in the beginning is the λόγος, and as you say, that is not a beginning which precedes another beginning: for a beginning without beginning, if indeed it both is and is called a beginning. He therefore who was in the beginning is from αἰών, whether in God or around God. For the λόγος was around God and in the beginning. Therefore he always was. If he always was, it is necessary that he exist, not among those things which are not, nor that he was made.

John says: No one has ever seen God. Again: The only-begotten Son of God who is in the bosom of the Father, he has declared him. We have therefore these same things, that Jesus Christ is ὂν, that he is λόγος, that he was in the beginning, that he was around God, that he was and is in the bosom. Do not all these things manifestly and clearly signify that the Son of God is he to whom these things are attributed, ὂν and ὂν before all things; if God the Father, before ὂν exists, is understood as the potentiality of that which is ὂν? Which ὂν indeed leapt forth from its own potentiality in its own Father; τὸ ὂν itself receiving manifestation, which had been hidden: and this is the divine and ineffable generation. The dogma that Jesus came from or proceeded from those things which are not must therefore be banished.

XVII. Let us look again at another matter. Jesus is the λόγος. What then is λόγος? I say: it is a certain paternal active power, which is unmoved, and which constitutes itself so as to be in act, not in potentiality. If therefore this is so, why was ὁ λόγος around God? Necessarily around that very thing, so that through αὐτὸν λόγον all things might be begotten, and without him nothing. God therefore operates through the λόγος, and the λόγος always operates. It is therefore an active unmoved power, which always operates, and which constitutes that what was in potentiality should be in actuality. This therefore we say was in the beginning. But to be in the beginning does not signify to have been generated. And truly therefore God is the λόγος, because he was in the beginning as God, and was around God. The λόγος was not generated, since God himself is the λόγος, but a resting and silent λόγος: so that you may see the necessity of recognizing that the λόγος was not generated, far more than that he himself came to be from those things which are not. XVIII.

What then of our knowledge? How does it proceed? How does it move around the λόγος? It does not see the λόγος as though he exists for the sake of something else, or belongs to another insofar as he exists. He exists for this purpose, to constitute another being, and in no other way whatsoever. The λόγος therefore is the father and generator of all things, through whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made. But the power of αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου, the power of constituting and making another, must not be understood and heard in this way, as in the cause of all things. For he was also constituted even of αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου himself. For if the first cause is the cause not only of all other things but of itself, God therefore is from himself, and is God. XIX. But since this very being, which is to be moved and to understand, is to act; potentiality is first; and constitutive potentiality, I say, is first. Necessarily therefore being itself precedes.

Therefore both understanding and being moved and acting come from that which is being. But according to what it is, to be in actuality: this is to be the Son; and this more so than that very being which is the Father; which being is to act and to operate. For there being and operating are not two different things. For that simple one is simple and one and always alone. In the Father therefore is the Son, and in the Son the Father. XX. How therefore was it effected? How are there Son and Father, if they are simultaneous? And not only both simultaneous, but one and alone and simple. But this ought not to be inquired into, for it suffices to believe. Let us speak then, since it is permitted. First it is clear that the λόγος is neither another thing nor from another, but around God. For the Gospel says: In the beginning was the λόγος, and the λόγος was around God. Again it says: The only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father.

How do you receive or understand these words? The Romans render πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν as apud Deum, as though toward the interior, or deep within, that is, in the existence of God: and this is true. For in that which is being, operating also inheres. For the λόγος is in God: and thus the Son is in the Father.

For the cause is being itself toward action: for being must be first, in which operating inheres: and this is God. These two therefore—two I say according to power—but according to the understanding of simplicity, I say one alone. If therefore the beginning is the cause of being itself toward operation and action, acting is generated from that which is being. But being is the Father: therefore operating is the Son.

XXI. What then is the generation, or the appearance of generation? First, however, if it is necessary to say this, let no one take ἔμφασιν as implying time. First, I speak according to understanding. First, therefore, we say that, turned back into itself, it both moves and understands inwardly the blessedness placed in repose, kept in all ways perfect. But it belongs to the very blessedness and greatness of God, both inwardly and outwardly, both to move and to act. For everything that is wholly, is both inwardly and outwardly. How this is so—both inwardly and outwardly, God existing both in all things and in the whole—must be said afterwards.

XXII. But now receive the reasons for understanding that ἔμφασιν of time is entirely absent, if according to prior and posterior, all things are accomplished entirely without time. For all things are from eternity. God therefore, in all ways perfect, and above all-ways-perfect: he who created all things, and who is the cause of all things: not that very thing alone which was one and alone; but also many and all things which have the power to be, he both was and willed all things to be. But other things, without action, how was it possible for them to be? Therefore action leapt forth by the will of God: but that action itself was the will of God: for everything there is simple.

The Λόγος therefore who is in God, he himself is God, he himself is will, he himself is understanding, he himself also is life, he himself is action: from a motion generated out of itself, from that which is being, he proceeded into his own proper being: that is, into that wherein acting consists; the acting itself appeared, which indeed made all things. But that very thing was born from that which is being, into that which is acting; having in that which is acting, also being. Just as that being both has acting and being: so this, acting has also being. But the acting itself, this is being; as that being, this is what acting is. Therefore these two are one and simple.

XXIII. If this is so, Jesus is neither from nothing—he who appeared as action from that which is being, since that very action also was what being is—nor is τὸ ὁμοούσιον absent on account of these two; because it is the same, which belongs to one and the same substance. There is certainly one unity, one action: inasmuch as the acting itself is also being. This is the Son, this one is from the Father, this one is around God, this one is he who is in the bosom of the Father, this one is within, this one is without. For in work outwardly, in that which is being inwardly: and in the Father, he himself is God in God, who is altogether the same as him: but by action he is Son. And wherever he is, there is both being and action: and in this manner, he is both Father and God, and he is Son and Λόγος.

XXIV. Where then is that impious and blasphemous understanding? Where does it find place that something is other, and has place from another? Where is that which further says that Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is from nothing? Where is that which is nothing? How can what is nothing fall upon God or upon the thought of God? For true thought is from true things. But what is not truly, is false. God therefore does not think or act upon what is not truly. But it deceives us, because we believe more in the power of God in this respect, if from things that truly are not, he should make those things that truly are. But insofar as the power of God can do all things, to that same extent, according to what power is, it generates nothing other than those things of which it has the power that they should be. But of those things that in all ways truly are not, there is in every respect no power at all.

XXV. How then, with no power existing of those things that truly are not, was the action of those things that are brought about? Indeed if it is the power of God that those things which cannot be are led into being, then according to power they already have being, or they are ὄντα, those very things which altogether εἰσὶ μὴ ὄντα. And for this reason we said those things are not, which, placed in hiddenness and in power, have not yet appeared in action. For all things were in God. For the Λόγος is the seed of all things that are. For the Λόγος is in God: in the operation, that is in the power of God, who is the Son of God, all things that were made appeared.

XXVI. But certain sacrilegious persons say: If the Λόγος was around God, and the Son existing above the bosom of God, he is understood to be not within the bosom but outside. But what then? God breathed a soul into man from himself, from within: but the creator of all things, the liberator and sanctifier of that very soul, and the redeemer and raiser of the whole body—not from within? Did he not send forth the angelic nature from within? But when he formed man from the earth, and the other cattle and four-footed beasts, and again all living things from water, and the rest in the air from one thing into another, and that from which first from those things that are not: but Jesus, whence do you say he comes? For the Son was before all things. Is he then from the void, and altogether from nothing? Then he formed his body: but did the soul or spirit have no body before he entered into the world? Did he have a soul?

He breathed it in, therefore, or blew it in: nor indeed into him. For how into him, since he did not yet have a body? But if what he breathed in was the Son himself. If this is so, then the Son is from God: and so also the Spirit. For the Spirit is not from nothing. For God says: Every spirit I have sent forth. By breathing in, therefore, God breathed upon himself, and thus the Son was born: God therefore did not make him. He is therefore not around God or above the bosom outside, but within. Both things David testifies, saying: My heart has belched forth a good Word. Therefore what the Son is was not made, as all things are: contrary to what God says. For if he was made; before he was made, the Word of God was not.

XXVII. What then do we say? Is it not necessary to confess, if the Word made all things, that the Word is first of all things, as the Word in all ways Word, the Word which we and the prophets and the evangelists name Λόγος and Son? Moses says thus: In the beginning God made heaven and earth. According to Aquila the same thing is thus: In the chapter God made: as the Hebrews pronounce the saying of Moses: whether in the beginning or in the chapter, God made it in Christ. Therefore the beginning and the head is Christ. And this is frequently said: He created all things in Christ. For Christ as Λόγος is the seed of all things. Therefore Christ is first: for he was before every creature. Whence then is Christ?

If he is the Word, from God: if will, from God: if moreover motion or action, from God: and if the acting itself and being is, according to being itself the Father is, but the Son is action: and since being itself is action, and acting is being; for this reason ὁμοούσιον and the Father αὐτὸς λόγος.

XXVIII. But how ὁμοούσιον, when substance does not yet exist? Names indeed have been both invented and adopted from those things that are later, and from those things that are after God. And since no name worthy of God is to be found, we name God from those things we know; holding in our understanding that we do not name or call him properly: just as we say, God lives, God understands. Accordingly we name the actions of God from our own actions, yet with him existing above all things; and not merely existing, but as it were existing, οὐδὲ ὄντως ὑπάρχοντος, ἀλλὰ ὄντος μικροῦ ὑπάρχοντος. In this manner also we apply substance, existence, and other things of this kind to God, and we speak of οὐσίαν of his essence in one way, while created substance stands in another relation to what is inherent in it and to its own being.

XXIX. Similarly also when we say that God was made Christ or man: not that he was truly made, but because he is one, and is in all things, and all things are in him: and for this reason he is said to have been made all things to all, that they might be: not that he was made that he might be, but that he was brought about so as to be thus. Indeed it is not said that the Son of God was made, but that he was made Lord for us; just as Solomon says: And that he made me above thy ways. For concerning the eternal and divine generation he immediately adds: Before all things the Lord begat me. And John says: What was made, in him was life. What then? Did not God make the creature, and in the creature first heaven and earth? He did not therefore make Christ. Christ therefore was born, not made.

For wherever he is said to have been made, after the first and eternal begetting, he is said to have been subsequently brought about. As he is said to have been made of a woman; and in the Acts of the Apostles: Let the house of Israel therefore know most certainly, that God made this Christ, whom you took upon the wood of the cross. All these things are said after the generation, which is one and holy and ineffable—these things, I say, are all said. These things are not said with respect to his existence, but with respect to the acts and administration of his power and virtue. Concerning the generation therefore which is the Son of God, it is manifest both that he is ὁμοούσιον of his substance, in majesty, in proper signification and understanding, understood according to the being of existence of substance. And thus it has been demonstrated how ὁμοούσιον.

XXX. You have, my Candidus, what remains to be said. If Jesus the Son of God is son by generation. For you say: "If generation is motion, and motion is change; but to understand change in God is impossible: therefore it is necessarily impious to say that anything can be begotten from God: therefore Jesus is not the Son of God by generation." You have drawn this out in good order: but whom have you led astray? Perhaps me? But rather yourself. For you said that Jesus made God. What then? Is not making a motion? No less than acting. For to act is to make: just as to make is to act. Since both therefore exist in motion, change must necessarily follow: to posit which in God, as has been declared, is incongruous. It must therefore be confessed either that making is not motion, or that not every motion is change.

But indeed making is motion: and God made according to motion; to whom it in no way happens to be changed, and it is altogether unfitting for him to receive any accident whatsoever. It remains therefore that not every motion is change. If not every motion is change, what is more to be chosen concerning Jesus? That he exists according to generation, or according to making? According to divine understanding, according to generation. For even if God, as soon as he speaks, makes what he makes: yet to speak is a motion, with silence pre-existing: it is therefore a change, for the silent one to speak. But if God made through the Word, the Word existed before making. If the Word existed before making, it existed before according to generation. For the mind (ὁ nous, mind) generates the Word. Therefore the generation of Jesus, who is the λόγος. Which Jesus, those who are knowers of things say is son according to three modes: by truth, by nature, by position.

To be son according to truth, by this very fact that he is substance: and he himself is therefore both simultaneously and of the same substance, in the manner that both father and λόγος and son and God are. But son by nature in animal generation. By position truly in adoption. There are also other modes: as by character, age, discipline: as the Apostle Paul says: I have begotten you. The mode according to truth therefore is both a higher mode and more divine than all. But what the mode of his generation or sonship may be, whether according to the modes signified or other modes: I confess it to God, by whose power this has been accomplished. XXXI. It has been said by us sufficiently, as I believe, in other books, from whom the procession and descent is; and the return of the promised Holy Spirit has been declared: and concerning the threefold unity and the unitary trinity.

Nor can I bear hearing your dogma concerning the Holy Spirit, full of blasphemy: "That this Spirit exists for sanctification, and only sanctifies and teaches: and that he himself was made, like every creature." Whereas the Spirit himself differs by his own proper action from the Son, to whom nevertheless he is always present: just as the Son himself also differs by action from his Father, who nevertheless is Father according to that which is being. And thus of these three, existing as one and the same, there is one divinity and an undivided majesty; but οὐδὲ ἀντίθετα μήτε ἄθεα: but three one, and one three: and placed three times, one and the same and alone. But concerning these three, another discourse is ours. XXXII. Save us now, Father, grant us forgiveness of our sins. And indeed to say this of God, what it is, is a sin: and to say how it is, is a sin: and not to venerate with one voice, as soberly as can be done, but to wish to pronounce it.

But since you have given us, O holy Lord Father, the Spirit dividing to us as he wills, grant us also knowledge. For we have faith, and we speak: yet having all manner of ignorance concerning you. Nevertheless ever confessing you, Father God, and the Son Jesus Christ our Lord, and the Spirit in every word, who lives with you and the Son the same in eternity. Amen.